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ABSTRACT
We introduce a simple network model that is inspired by social in-
formation networks such as twitter. Agents are nodes, connecting
to another agent by building a directed edge has a cost, and reach-
ing other agents via short directed paths has a benefit; in effect, an
agent wants to reach others quickly, but without the cost of directly
connecting each and every one. Even in its simplest form, edges
in this framework are neither substitutes or complements in gen-
eral; hence, standard techniques are required to study the model’s
properties and dynamics do not apply.
We prove that an asynchronous edge dynamics always converge to
a stable network; in fact, for this convergence is fast for a range
of parameters. Moreover, the set of stable networks are nontriv-
ial and can support the type of network structures that have been
observed to appear in social information networks – from commu-
nity clusters to broadcast networks, depending on the parameters
many natural formations can emerge. We further study the static
game, and give classes of stable and efficient networks for nontriv-
ial parameter ranges. We close several problems, and leave many
interesting ones open.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter are now an
ubiquitous part of modern life. Moreover, given the prevalence of
economic situations in which the network of relationships between
agents play an important role in outcomes, it is essential to rigor-
ously understand how networks form and what network structures
are likely to emerge. Large interdisciplinary subfields that combine
economics, sociology, mathematics and computer science in the
study of social networks are emerging (see [5] for a survey). While
many models for social network exist, most are either stochastic
(i.e., probabilistic models) or are learned models (i.e., constructed
by fitting a set of parameters). The game theoretic approaches to
network formation that exist are largely motivated by games where
network infrastructure is being built and costs are shared amongst
agents (see, e.g., [20] Chapter 19), and do not necessarily capture
natural properties of online social networks. We introduce a sim-
ple directed network model that has a natural interpretation with
respect to many online social networks. Agents are nodes in the
network and the model is defined by three key parameters:
1. the cost cs of directly connecting to another agent (i.e., mak-
ing a friend request),
2. the cost c` of accepting a connection another agent (i.e., con-
firming a friend request), and
3. the distance k (i.e., maximum path length) that suffices for
gaining utility from an indirect connection to another agent.
Agents trade off decisions between the cost of maintaining edges
against the rewards (in terms of connectivity) from doing so. Al-
lowing cs, c` > 0 captures many online social networks such as
Facebook and LinkedIn in which one agent initiates a connection
request and the other choses to accept or decline. When c` = 0,
the model captures other online social networks such as Twitter in
which a connection can be made unilaterally. The distance k cap-
tures the maximum path distance that suffices for deriving utility
from (indirect) connections; a generalization of this model can fur-
ther allow target sets T(v) which defines the set of agents that v
would like to reach within distance k.
We study natural dynamics in which agents periodically make asyn-
chronous decisions on whether to add or sever edges (the model and
dynamics are formally introduced in Section 2). Because edges in
this model are neither complements nor substitutes (see Figure 2),
standard techniques for analyzing the model do not apply. How-
ever, the fact that both forces exist allows for interesting and non-
trivial networks to appear as fixed points of the dynamics. In par-
ticular, as discussed in Section 3, stable networks can have both
open and closed triangles (i.e., a wide range of clustering coef-
ficients), can exhibit homophily or heterophily, and can support
various classes of real-world networks (e.g., exhibiting commu-
nity structures and/or features of a broadcast network).1 In Sec-
tion 4, we prove that the dynamic process converges; in fact when
cs, c` > 0 the convergence is fast. Lastly, we prove that for a non-
trivial range of parameters a flower graph is efficient and stable,
and a Kautz graph is symmetric-efficient (see Section 5).
On the theoretical front, we leave open the technically challenging
question of whether symmetric networks that are also stable exist
for nontrivial parameter ranges. On the practical front, we leave
open the question of evaluating the fit of the model against network
data sets; understanding the ranges of parameters observed in real
networks may lead to interesting insights about the participants and
the forces that drive them.
1This is in stark contrast to related settings in which the only fixed-
points are cycles and empty graphs [2].
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Figure 1: Example network depicting addable edges (green),
removable edges (red) and existing edges that are not remov-
able (black) for k = 2, cs = 1.5 and c` = 0.
For the sake of readability, we give an overview of the key results in
the main body of the paper; the majority of the proofs are presented
in the appendix.
2. OUR MODEL & KEY DEFINITIONS
2.1 Preliminaries and Notation
Let V be a set of agents with n = |V |.
Definition 1 (Bidirected Network) A bidirected network, denoted
by G = (V,Es, E`), is a network with vertex set V with two types
of directed edges; speaking edges suv ∈ Es,2 and listening edges
`vu ∈ E`.3
Note that suv exists independently of `uv; both, one, or none may
be present in the network. When clear from context, with some
abuse of notation, we drop the s/` demarkations and simply refer to
edges uv ∈ E. We let ds+G(v) = |{w|svw ∈ Es}| denote the num-
ber of outgoing speaking edges of v, and let ds−G(v) = |{w|swv ∈
Es}| denote the number of incoming speaking edges to v. The
analogous definition is used for listening out-degree (d`+G(v)) and
in-degree (d`−G(v)).
Definition 2 (Speaking and Listening Reachability) We say there
is a speaking path of length k from v to u if there exists a set of
speaking edges svv1 , sv1v2 , . . . , svk−1u ∈ Es and a set of lis-
tening edges `uvk−1 , `vk−1vk−2 , . . . , `v1v ∈ E`. We say that a
vertex u that has a speaking path of length at most k from v is
k-speaking-reachable from v, and let RsG,k(v) ⊆ V be the set of
all such vertices. Listening paths, listening reachability, and the
set of listening-reachable vertices R`G,k(v) ⊆ V are defined in an
analogous manner.
With some abuse of notation, when k is clear from context we drop
it from the notation above. Note that if u is speaking-reachable
from v then v is listening-reachable from u.
2.2 The Model
Each agent v ∈ V has a strategy Sv = (Ssv, S`v), which consists of
subsets of agents Ssv, S`v ⊆ V . Thinking of agents as vertices, Ssv
(respectively S`v) corresponds to the set of vertices that v connects
to by building speaking (respectively listening) edges svu (respec-
tively `vu). Thus, the strategy vector S = (S1, . . . , Sn) defines a
bidirected network G = (V,Es, E`) where Es = {vu|u ∈ Ssv}
and E` = {vu|u ∈ S`v}. With some abuse of notation, we often
refer to G as the set of strategies and will use G and S interchange-
ably.
2An edge suv can be thought of as u initiating contact with v.
3An edge `vu can be thought of as v accepting contact from u.
(a) Complements: If ij is added,
then ki becomes addable.
(b) Substitutes: If ij is added,
then ki becomes removable.
Figure 2: Edges can be strategic substitutes or complements
depending on the structure in the rest of the network. In the
examples above, k = ∞, c` = 0, and j in (a) & (b) and i in (a)
belong to strongly connected components of size ≥ cs.
The utility of v is given by UG(v) = UsG,k(v) + U
`
G,k(v) where
UsG,k(v) = |RsG,k(v)| − cs · ds+G(v),
U `G,k(v) = |R`G,k(v)| − c` · d`+G(v)
are the utilities derived from speaking and listening respectively.
The costs cs and c` capture the cost of maintaining speaking and
listening edges respectively.
A natural special case is that in which one of the costs is 0 (without
loss of generality c` = 0). For such a model, an agent can always
set S`v = V without loss to her utility. Hence, the strategy space
boils down to Ssv . Moreover, we can consider only the speaking
portion of the utility UG,k(v) = UsG,k(v) without loss of general-
ity. In such cases we drop all s/` demarkations and simply think
of a directed network G = (V,E) = (V,Es). This special case,
when we further assume that k = ∞, is equivalent to the network
model in [2].
2.3 Dynamics
In this paper we only consider dynamics that are asynchronous (i.e.,
one agent updates at a time) and stochastic (i.e., agents update in
a random order). A shorthand notation for the network obtained
by adding (alternatively, deleting) the edge vw from an existing
network G is G + vw (alternatively, G − vw). Similarly, we let
G + Sv be the network obtained by adding all vu edges where
u ∈ Sv to G. The following definition is convenient for a variety
of our definitions and results.
Definition 3 (Addable and Removable Edges) We say an edge uv ∈
G is removable if UG−uv(u) > UG(u). Similarly, we say an edge
uv 6∈ G is addable if UG+uv(u) > UG(u).
See Figure 2.2 for an example of a network where the addable and
removable edges are depicted.
We can then define the edge dynamics as follows:
Definition 4 (Edge Dynamics) In each round, one potential (speak-
ing or listening) edge vw is selected at random. Without loss of
generality, assume it is a speaking edge. If svw ∈ Es then the edge
is deleted if and only if it is removable. Alternatively, if svw /∈ Es
then the edge is added if and only if it is addable. The analogous
definition is used for listening edges.
2.3.1 Complementarity & Substituability
We remark that one of the difficulties in analyzing this model arises
from the fact that edges can be either strategic complements or sub-
stitutes depending on the structure of the remainder of the network
(see, e.g., Figure 2). Hence, standard approaches do not apply for
the analysis of this model and its dynamics.
Figure 3: Stable networks may have open and closed triangles
depending on the structure in the rest of the network. In the
above example, let k ≥ 2, c` = 0 and 1 < cs < 2.
2.4 Stability and Efficiency
Denote by S−v by the (n− 1)-dimensional vector of the strategies
played by all agents other than v. With some abuse of notation we
use (Sv,S−v) and S and G interchangeably as is convenient.
Definition 5 (Stability) A strategy vector S is said to be stable if
for all agents v and each potential strategy S′v ⊆ V , we have that
USv,S−v (v) ≥ US′v,S−v (v).
This is equivalent to saying that S is a Nash equilibrium.
In other words, no agent v has any incentive to change her strategy
from Sv to S′v , assuming that all other agents stick to their cur-
rent strategies. Observe that such a solution is self-enforcing in the
sense that once the agents are playing such a solution, no one has
any incentive to deviate. In fact, for our model, something stronger
holds:
Proposition 6 A strategy vector is stable if and only if no edge is
addable or removable.
Pairwise stability is a common strengthening of the notion of sta-
bility. It is natural in social networks where, effectively, a link be-
tween two agents is formed only if both endpoints are in agree-
ment, but either can unilaterally delete an edge. In our model, an
agent’s utility is never decreased by an incoming edge, hence there
is no difference between stability and pairwise stability. However,
in the bidirected case (when cs, c` > 0), an extended notion of
pairwise stability where a speaking edge and its corresponding lis-
tening edge are consider in conjunction is natural.
Definition 7 (Bidirected Pairwise Stability) A strategy vector S
is said to be bi-pairwise stable if for all pairs of agents u, v
US−suv (u) ≤ US(u), US−`uv (u) ≤ US(u),
and if
US+suv+`vu(u) > US(u) then US+suv+`vu(v) < US(v).
For the remainder of this paper we refer to this notion as pairwise
stability.
Often, notion of fairness or global optimality are important consid-
erations. The utilitarian objective welfare of a set of strategies is
the collective utility of all of the agents; i.e., for the strategy set G,
it is ϕ(G) =
∑
v UG(v).
Definition 8 (Efficiency and Symmetry) We say a set of strate-
gies S, and the network G it defines, is efficient if it maximizes
ϕ(G). It is symmetric if UG(v) = UG(u) for all u, v ∈ V , and
is asymmetric otherwise. It is symmetric-efficient if it maximizes
ϕ(G) over to the set of symmetric networks.
(a) Homophily. (b) Heterophily.
Figure 4: Stable structures may display heterophily or ho-
mophily depending on the structure in the rest of the network.
In the example above, let L and R denote the nodes on the left
and right respectively. Then both of the above networks are
stable for k ≥ 6, T (v) = L if v ∈ L and T (v) = R otherwise,
c` = 0 and cs < 3.
Note that, a priori, efficiency, symmetry, and stability need not be
satisfied simultaneously. One aim of this work is to explore these
relationships for our model.
Lastly, we give a couple of preliminary observations that will be-
come useful in later proofs.
Lemma 9 If G is bi-pairwise stable then G is stable.
Definition 10 (Complete Edges) With some abuse of notation, we
say a speaking edge svw is complete if
svw ∈ Es ⇒ `wv ∈ E`
We say a listening edge `vw is complete if
`vw ∈ E` ⇒ swv ∈ Es.
In any stable or efficient network, if cs, c` > 0, all edges are com-
plete. Hence, despite allowing unilateral actions, agreement natu-
rally emerges.
Lemma 11 If cs > 0, c` > 0, then for any stable, pairwise stable,
or efficient network G all speaking and listening edges are com-
plete.
3. NONTRIVIAL NETWORK STRUCTURES
In this section we present a series of toy examples that show how a
variety of nontrivial network structures are supported by our model.
3.1 Clustering
The model can support both open and closed triangles, even within
the same network, for various ranges of parameters (see Figure 3).
This indirectly implies that stable networks in this model may have
any amount of clustering; e.g., by replicating node z and with its
zu edge d times in Figure 3, the clustering coefficient goes to 1 as
d→ 0, and goes to 0 as d→∞.
3.2 Homophily & Heterophily
A natural generalization of our model is to define target sets T s(v)
and T `(v) ⊆ V and consider utilities
UsG,k(v) = |RsG,k(v) ∩ T s(v)| − cs · ds+G(v),
U `G,k(v) = |R`G,k(v) ∩ T `(v)| − c` · d`+G(v).
Such a model captures agents who participate in a larger network,
but are only interested in connecting to some subset of nodes. One
(a) Community Clusters. (b) Broadcast Networks. (c) Brand Clusters. (d) Polarized Crowds.
Figure 5: Depending on the parameters, stable networks may display many different global characteristics that are known to appear
in real-world networks.
could then wonder whether stable networks tend to exhibit ho-
mophily or heterophily. Interesting, even for the same set of pa-
rameters, both can be supported (see Figure 4). That being said,
roughly, the smaller that k is and the larger that cs is, the more
likely homophily is to occur. E.g., in the same figure, if k = 3
and cs > 1 then only the leftmost network is stable. In effect, the
network can no longer “waste” edges that do not directly reach the
target sets.
3.3 Real-World Networks Supported
We further note that a wide variety of information networks that ap-
pear in real-world datasets such as twitter can be explained by our
model as the structures that they form are fixed points of the dy-
namics for certain ranges of parameters. Here, we briefly consider
four well-known real-world networks structures (using the termi-
nology and characterization as described in the overview by [16])
to illustrate this point.
Community Clusters. Such networks contain many different (pos-
sibly non-disjoint) communities, each of which has different inter-
ests or properties. Each node v is interested in participating in some
subset of these communities; these interests can be captured by
T s(v) and T `(v) as mentioned above. The structure of a network
of community clusters contains many medium or small size com-
ponents that may or may not be directly connected to each other.
Indeed, such structures emerge simply with the addition of the tar-
get sets as above. The size of the components varies depending on
k.
Broadcast Networks. In these networks people are mostly con-
nected to or through an existing central node and not so much to
each other another. News media outlets and influencers on social
media are examples of such central nodes. Such networks contain
a main large component; reaching this component results in reach-
ing many other nodes, and are fixed points of the dynamics for
our model, when, for example, k = ∞, and T (v) ≈ V for most
v ∈ V . For example, the proof of convergence for Theorem 12
shows a process that would reach some such network. The flower
graph in Figure 6 is another example.
Brand Clusters. In such networks, there are many small compo-
nents that are almost disconnected from each other. For an example
of such networks, consider the discussions on twitter or similar so-
cial networks about local events, niche products or subjects. Indi-
viduals may mention or describe them, or connect to a small source,
but do not reply to or discuss with a large group. Such structures are
fixed points of our dynamics when |T s(v)| and k are both small.
Polarized Crowds. In such networks there are a small number of
main poles (e.g., republican and democrat) and the target set of each
node is only one of these poles. The networks in effect look like two
or more copies of a broadcast network, but split according to target
set. The nodes form two large (almost) disconnected components.
Such network structures are fixed points of the dynamics in our
model for sufficiently large k, when V is partitioned into (mostly)
disjoint subsets such that target set of each node is the part of V that
it belongs to. Similar to the discussion on homophily, the smaller
that k is the more polarized we expect the networks to be.
4. CONVERGENCE OF DYNAMICS
In studying the dynamics, different approaches are required for
the special case where c` = 0 (i.e., the network is directed) and
more general bidirected setting (where cs, c` > 0). In the latter,
an agent’s hand is often forced; as reachability can only occur via
paths of complete edges, u never has incentive to add an edge suv if
`vu is not present (a layman’s interpretation is to say that one can-
not accept a connection that is not initiated). This, in effect, speeds
convergence and makes our work easier. We consider both settings
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
4.1 The Directed Setting (c` = 0)
In this section we consider the setting where c` = 0. Recall that
in this case we can assume S` = V and the model reduces to that
for a directed network with only speaking edges. Moreover, for
the directed setting, our results only hold for k = ∞. Hence, for
ease of notation we drop all s, ` and k demarkations, e.g., G =
(V,E) = (V,Es), c = cs, UG = UsG,k, and uv = suv .
It is a priori not clear that any dynamics should converge, or that
any interesting structure could emerge at a fixed point of the dy-
namics.4 On the other hand, as is evident in our proof of following
theorem, a nontrivial class of networks are fixedpoints of the edge
dynamics.
Theorem 12 The edge dynamics for k = ∞ converge to a stable
graph.
PROOF. In order to prove convergence, it suffices to show that
for any initial network G1, there exists a finite sequence of graphs
G1, . . . , Gs such that Gi 6= Gj for any i 6= j and Gi and Gi+1
differ by a single edge that is either addable or removable in Gi
such that Gs is stable. In other words, there is a path to conver-
gence from any state which only uses addable or removable edges.
If this path is finite, there is some (albeit tiny) probability, which
is bounded away from 0, that this sequence of edges is selected.
4E.g., recall that the authors of [2] find that synchronous best-
response dynamics must converge to either the cycle or the empty
network under the same conditions.
Hence, it suffices to construct such a sequence. To that end let us
first state some defenitions.
Definition 13 We represent each component by the set of its ver-
tices, we call a component large if the set of its vertices is of size at
least c and we call it small otherwise.
Definition 14 We call a component/vertex root if it has no incom-
ing edge, leaf if it has no outgoing edge and isolated if it has none
of them.
We construct the sequence as follows:
1. Recursively delete removable edges one at a time until no
removable edge remains.
2. If there is no addable edge then we have reached a stable
graph.
3. Otherwise, partition the network into maximal strongly con-
nected components; the component-level network must be a
directed acyclic network (Lemma 27). It is often convenient
for us to restrict to the large-components. Roots and leaves
are then defined within the large-component graph. Note that
there must be at least one large component, otherwise we
contradict the fact that an edge is addable (Lemma 30).
4. For each root Ti of the large-component graph, designate a
special vertex ri. Note that for any (large or small) compo-
nent C such that Ti 6⊆ RG(C), the edge xri is addable for
any x ∈ C (Lemma 31); hence, the edges specified in steps
5-7 must be addable.
5. If some leaf Li 6= Ti exists in the large-component network
rooted at Ti, add the edge `iri for some `i ∈ Li and go back
to step 1.
6. Otherwise, all large-components have no edges between them
in the large-component graph. If there are more than one
large components, let T1, T2 be any two large-components
such that T1 6⊆ RG(T2). Add the edge r2r1. If T2 6⊆
RG+r2r1(T1), also add the edge r1r2. Go back to step 1.
7. Otherwise, there is exactly one large-component T1. If there
exists a small component Sj that is a leaf, add the edge sjr1
for some sj ∈ Sj and go back to step 1.
8. Again, there is exactly one large-component T1, and this set
T1 is reachable from every component (otherwise we would
be in step 7). Moreover, there must be at least one small
component Sk that is a root and in which |RG(Sk)\T1| > c
(Lemma 36). Let tkrk be an edge that reaches T1 on a path
from Sk, i.e., rk ∈ T1 and tk 6∈ T1, and tk ∈ RG(Sk). Add
the edge rksk for some sk ∈ Sk and go back to step 1.
We prove in Lemma 26 that the only addable edges are between two
different components; hence only inter-component edges must be
addable; the above steps cover all possible types of addable edges
in sequence until none remain.
After step 5+1 (alternatively 6+1), the number of large components
that existed before step 5 (alternatively 6) is reduced by at least one
(see Lemma 33 and Lemma 34 respectively). Hence, we will reach
step 7 in finitely many rounds.
In step 7 there is exactly one large component (see also Lemma 30),
and the number components without a direct edge to T1 is reduced
by one. Moreover, after step 7 there are no removable edges, so the
number of large components and the size of the largest component
does not change in step 7+1 (Lemma 35). Thus, we never go back
to steps 5 or 6, and after finitely many rounds, we will move on to
step 8.
In step 8 again there is exactly one large component. In step 8+1 the
the number of large components does not increase, thus, we never
go back to step 5 or 6. While we may go back to step 7, however,
every time we complete step 8 we have removed at least one edge
from being addable at any point in the future (Lemma 25). Hence,
we can remain in steps 7 and 8 for finitely many rounds, and the
process will terminate in step 2.
One important question that remains open is the time until con-
vergence; in particular, we conjecture that the convergence time is
fast. In effect, this is equivalent to showing that there are many
short paths to convergence. Proving this, however, remains a chal-
lenging technical open problem.
4.2 The Bidirected Setting (cs, c` > 0)
We now go back to the bidirected setting. As observed above, the
convergence is less surprising; as edges that are not complete are
easily deleted, and furthermore are never added back to the solution
(see Lemma 17)
Theorem 15 If cs, c` > 0, then the edge dynamics (see Defini-
tion 4) converge to a stable network in (expected) polynomial time
in the number of nodes.
PROOF. Let pG be the number of complete edges (see Defini-
tion 10) and let mG be the number of edges in network G. We will
prove the theorem by induction on pG +mG.
Base Case: Suppose that pG +mG = 0, thus pG = 0, mG = 0
so G is empty and by Proposition 37, the empty network is stable.
Inductive step: For sake of contradiction, assume that the dynam-
ics do not converge to a stable graph. Thus, since the number of
possible networks is finite, there must exist a sequence of networks
that we cycle over. If there exists v, w ∈ V such that svw ∈ Es and
`wv /∈ E`, then with probability at least 1
2
· 1
n
· 1
n− 1 , the edge svw
is chosen. By Lemma 16, this edge is removable. Therefore, the
number of edges is reduced, so pG−svw+mG−svw = pG+mG−1.
Thus by the induction hypothesis, G − svw converges to a stable
network. Similarly, if svw /∈ Es and `wv ∈ E` an analogous proof
follows.
Otherwise, for all v, w ∈ V , if svw ∈ Es then `wv ∈ E` and if
`vw ∈ E` then swv ∈ Es. SinceG is not stable, there must exist an
edge which addable or removable. By Lemma 17 we know that no
removed edge will be added again. Hence, the only possible change
is to remove an edge. Suppose that svw is an existing removable
edge for v. The probability of selecting svw and `wv consecutively
is at least
(
1
2
· 1
n
· 1
n− 1
)2
. Moreover, we know that if svw and
`wv are selected in sequence then both will be removed as svw is
removable, and then `wv will be removable by Lemma 16. Thus,
for new network we have that pG−svw−`vw + mG−svw−`vw =
pG +mG − 3.
The convergence happens in expected polynomial time because the
probabilities, as computed above, shows that after O(n4) moves
in expectation, the value of pG + mG will decrease. We know
Figure 6: A balanced flower network with n = 26 vertices and
k = 10. This is efficient and stable for c < 5.
that pG + mG = O(n2). Thus, after at most O(n6) moves in
expectation we will reach a stable network.
Lemma 16 Suppose that cs > 0 and v, w ∈ V . If svw ∈ Es, `wv /∈
E`, then svw is removable.
PROOF. We know that the profit of existence a speaking edge is
made by providing speaking reachability. Moreover since `wv /∈
E`, by the definition of reachability, there is no path from v to arbi-
trary node z that passes through svw so the gain of it zero. There-
fore removing svw has no loss for v.
Lemma 17 If cs, c` > 0 and there exist vertices v, w ∈ V such
that svw /∈ Es, `wv /∈ E`, then the edge dynamics will never add
it back.
PROOF. We will prove the contrapositive. Assume that some
such svw is added back. We know that `wv /∈ E`. Thus, by the
definition of reachability, there is no path from v to any arbitrary
node z which passes through svw. Hence, z ∈ RsG(v) if and only if
z ∈ RsG+svw (v). Therefore, |RsG(v)| = |RsG+svw (v)|. However,
ds+G+svw (v) = ds
+
G(v) + 1 so UG+svw (v) = UG(v) − cs and
since cs > 0 thus UG+svw (v) < UG(v). Therefore agent v does
not gain by adding svw and wo not add it for ever. The similar
proof used for listening edges.
Using this lemma, we give a very different proof than the one for
the directed setting. In addition to working for arbitrary k, this
proof also allows us to conclude that the convergence is fast.
5. STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY
In this section we construct classes of efficient and stable networks.
We first consider nontrivial ranges of parameters k > 1 and cs, c` ≤
n− 1 (see Section 5 for a discussion of extremal parameter ranges
and networks). For this range of parameters, we see interesting
networks emerge in the study of efficient and stable networks.
Remark 18 For ease of notation, in the first part of this section we
consider only the directed version of our model (i.e., without loss of
generality, c` = 0). However, all results and proofs follow immedi-
ately for the bidirectional case by replacing the directed graphs in
question by the analogous bidirected network where each directed
edge is replaced by a complete bidirected edge. In the statement of
the theorems, constraints on c apply to both cs and c`.
The first network we consider, called balanced flower graph, is de-
fined for k ≤ 2√n and is constructed as follows: Make a directed
cycle of length
⌊
k/2
⌋
+ 1 . Select one node from this set and call it
the center. As long as at least
⌊
k/2
⌋
nodes remain, select them, and,
along with the center node, form another directed cycle. Repeat
until fewer than
⌊
k/2
⌋
nodes remain; then remove one non-central
node from each petal (severing its edges and connecting its prede-
cessor and successor) until you have
⌊
k/2
⌋−1 nodes and form them
into the final petal. We denote by q the number of petals. Note at
most one node is removed from each petal in balancing since since
k ≤ 2√n, and hence q ≥ ⌊k/2⌋. Note that the balanced flower
network has diameter at most k. See Figure 6 for an example.
Theorem 19 For any 4 ≤ k ≤ 2√n and 3 ≤ n, the social welfare
of the balanced flower network (see Figure 6) is
n(n− 1)− c
⌈
n− 1⌊
k
2
⌋ ⌉− c(n− 1)
Moreover, if 1 ≤ c < ⌊k/2⌋ − 1 the balanced flower network is
efficient and pairwise stable.
Before we prove the theorem, in order to show pairwise stability, a
useful lemma is stated:
Lemma 20 If G be stable and strongly connected, then G is pair-
wise stable.
PROOF. Since G is stable, it contains no removable edge. As
G is strongly connected, for any vertex v, the positive component
of UG(v) is 2(n − 1) and cannot be increased. Hence, there is no
addable pair in G. Thus, G is pairwise stable.
PROOF OF THEOREM 19. The social welfare of the balanced
flower network is
n(n− 1)− c
⌈
n− 1⌊
k
2
⌋ ⌉− c(n− 1)
as the utility of the center node is (n−1)−cq = (n−1)−c
⌈
n−1⌊
k
2
⌋⌉,
and the utility of all other nodes is (n − 1) − c. Hence, the social
welfare is
(n− 1) · ((n− 1)− c) + (n− 1)− c
⌈
n− 1⌊
k
2
⌋ ⌉
= n(n− 1)− c
⌈
n− 1⌊
k
2
⌋ ⌉− c(n− 1)
Let us now prove that the flower network G is stable. By Lemma
20, this will give pairwise stability. We must show that for all
agents v, and alternate strategy s′v ⊆ V , we have
USv,S−v (v) ≥ US′v,S−v (v).
First, consider a vertex v that is not the center; since all vertices are
reachable from v by paths of length at most k, the positive compo-
nent of the utility cannot be increased. Hence, utility can only be
improved by lowering the cost; however, |Sv| = 1, and if |S′v| = ∅,
then v′s utility is 0, which is strictly less than UG(v). Thus, v does
not have an alternate strategy that can improve her utility.
Now consider the center vertex u. Again, all vertices are reach-
able from u by paths of length at most k, so the positive compo-
nent of the utility cannot be increased, and the negative component
can only be decreased by decreasing the number of outgoing edges
from u. For sake of contradiction, assume there is some |S′u| < q
that is u’s best response. Note that S′u must disconnect u from at
least one petal. Since each petal has at least
⌊
k/2
⌋ − 1 non-center
nodes and c <
⌊
k/2
⌋−1, adding the edge from u to the petal to S′u
would increase the utility; this contradicts the fact that |S′u| < q can
be a best response. Hence, the balanced flower network is stable.
Now we prove that the balanced flower network is efficient. First,
consider the network that would arise if we simply connected the
remainder nodes into a small petal without balancing. This is what
is known as simply a flower graph. It is known that, for any n
and 2 ≤ k ≤ n, the flower network attains the fewest number of
edges of any connected network on n nodes with diameter k (see
Theorems 1 and 2 in [9]). Note that our balanced flower network
has the same number of edges as the flower graph; hence it also
attains the fewest number of edges of any connected network on n
nodes with diameter k. Therefore, the balanced flower network is
optimal amongst the set of strongly connected graphs.
Hence, it suffices to show that a network that is not strongly con-
nected cannot be efficient. We prove the contrapositive. Assume
there is a network that is not strongly connected; we show that we
can combine any two maximal strongly connected components into
a single strongly connected component that is at least as efficient.
Take two strongly connected of size a ≥ 1 and n−a ≥ 1. Clearly,
from above, the social welfare of each component can only improve
by making it a balanced flower, and this does not affect the social
welfare of the remaining graph. Since it is possible that one com-
ponent is connected to the other (but not vice versa), without loss
of generality the social welfare of this network is at most
a(a− 1)− c
⌈
a− 1⌊
k/2
⌋ ⌉− c(a− 1)
+ (n− a)(n− 1)− c
⌈
n− a− 1⌊
k/2
⌋ ⌉− c(n− a− 1)
≤ n(n− 1)− a(n− a)− c
(⌈
n− 1⌊
k/2
⌋ ⌉− 2)− cn
= n(n− 1)− c
⌈
n− 1⌊
k/2
⌋ ⌉− c(n− 1) + c− a(n− a)
≤ n(n− 1)− c
⌈
n− 1⌊
k/2
⌋ ⌉− c(n− 1) +√n− (n− 1),
where the last inequality follows as c <
⌊
k/2
⌋− 1 ≤ ⌊√n⌋− 1 ≤√
n and 1 ≤ a ≤ n − 1. For n ≥ 3, this is less than the social
welfare attained by the balanced flower.
Remark 21 In fact, for any 2 ≤ k, the (unbalanced) flower net-
work which leaves the last petal at it’s size without rebalancing is
also efficient; the constraint is due to the fact that for k > 2
√
n bal-
ancing as described above may not be possible. We could, instead,
define a recursive balancing process that continues to steal ver-
tices (possibly several from the same petal) until a balanced flower
Figure 7: Kautz network with 24 vertices, outdegree 2 and di-
ameter 4. This is a symmetric-efficient network for n = 24,
k = 4, and c < 10, and is stable for c < 1.
is reached for some k′ < k; efficiency follows directly, as does
stability for a reduced c which is a function of n and k.
While the above network is efficient, they are highly asymmetric
with a single node taking on most of the cost. Hence, we now
turn our attention towards symmetric graphs, and consider a second
class of graphs, known as Kautz graphs [7, 10] (see Figure 7).
The Kautz network KDd is a directed network with (d + 1)d
D−1
vertices. The vertices are labeled by strings x0 . . . xD−1 of length
D with xi ∈ {0, . . . , d} with xi 6= xi+1. The set of edges is
defined by
{(x0, x1 . . . xD, x1 . . . xDxD+1)| xi ∈ {0, . . . , d} and xi 6= xi+1}.
Clearly, the network has outdegree d, (d+ 1)dD edges, and diam-
eter D + 1.
Kautz graphs arose in the study of the following question: Given a
network with n nodes and m edges, what is the smallest possible
diameter k? Through a series of works, it was shown that Kautz
graphs are asymptotically optimal with respect to this question (see
[17] for a survey).
In our case, we can rephrase the question as follows: Given a net-
work with n nodes and diameter k, what is the smallest possible
number of edges m? Clearly, such a network would maximize so-
cial welfare restricted to the set of strongly connected graphs; we
can extend this result to all graphs.
Theorem 22 For any k ≥ 4, n ≥ 16, and c < n/logk(n) the Kautz
networkKk−1logk(n) (see Figure 7) is asymptotically symmetric-efficient
5
and its social welfare is
n((n− 1)− clogk(n)).
Moreover, for c ≤ 1 the Kautz network is pairwise stable.
PROOF. The Kautz network is strongly connected and all ver-
tices have the same degree; hence it is symmetric. Each vertex is
5Generally, we assume that logk(n) ∈ Z, and then can make a
statement about asymptotic as n → ∞ for a fixed k on the set of
well-defined n.
connected to all others and each has degree dn = logk(n), hence
each vertex contributes (n− 1)− c logk(n) to the social welfare.
As discussed in the main body of the text, the Kautz network is
known to asymptotically have the fewest number of edges neces-
sary in order to have a network of size n with maximum diameter
k (see [17] for a survey), and hence it is asymptotically optimal
amongst the set of strongly connected graphs. Analogously to the
Proof of Theorem 19 (see the last paragraph), we can bootstrap this
result in order to prove efficiency amongst the set of all graphs by
showing that the social welfare of a network that is not strongly
connected is (asymptotically) at most the social welfare of the cor-
responding Kautz network for this range of parameters.
We prove the contrapositive. Assume there is a network that is
not strongly connected; take two strongly connected components of
size a ≥ 1 and b = n− a; we show that the Kautz network of size
n has at least as much social welfare as this graph. Clearly, from
above, the social welfare of each component can only improve by
making it a Kautz graph, and this does not affect the social welfare
of the remaining graph. Then, (since the two components may be
connected) the social welfare is at most
a(a− 1)− cada + (n− a)(n− 1)− c(n− a)dn−a
= n(n− 1)− a(n− a)− c (logk(aa(n− a)n−a))
≤ n(n− 1)− (n− 1)− c (logk((n− 1)n−1))
≤ n(n− 1)− c logk(nn) + c logk
(
nn
(n− 1)n−1
)
− (n− 1)
≤ n(n− 1)− c logk(nn)
where the last inequality follows for any constant c and k and large
enough n. This is the social welfare of the Kautz graph; hence the
Kautz network is asymptotically symmetric-efficient.
We now prove stability. By Lemma 20, this also gives pairwise
stability. Clearly, no strategy S′x such that |S′x| ≥ |Sx| can improve
the utility of x. Hence we first consider strategies S′x ⊆ Sx. Let
x = x0, . . . , xD and y = y0, . . . , yD be two nodes such that there
is there is no i such that xi = yD−i−1, . . . , xD = y0, . . . , yi.
Hence, the distance from x to y must be exactly k in the Kautz
graph. Consider any edge xz such that z0 6= y0. It must again hold
that there is no i such that zi = yD−i−1, . . . , zD = y0, . . . , yi;
otherwise there would have been some such i for x. Hence, the
distance from x to y is k + 1 if we remove edge xx′ where x′ =
x1, . . . , xD, y0. Hence, the strategy Sx \ xx′ does not improve x’s
utility since the cost reduces by at most 1 while at least one node
becomes unreachable. Note that, for every allowable y0, some such
vertex y exists. Hence, no strategy S′x ⊆ Sx improves x’s utility.
Lastly, for sake of contradiction, assume there is an optimal strategy
S′x such that |S′x| < |Sx|. Then, there must be some allowable y0
to which x does not build an edge. However, as we just observed,
S′x + xy0 improves the utility of x. This contradicts the optimality
of S′x. Hence, this concludes the proof.
Remark 23 We leave open the question of whether Kautz graphs
are stable for any c > 1, and more generally, the question of char-
acterizing optimal symmetric stable graphs.
We can further observe some properties of the extremal ranges of
the parameters where the stable and efficient network structures are
not as interesting. These results also lead to the following observa-
tion.
Corollary 24 The price of anarchy is 0; the price of stability is 1.
This follows from the definition of the price of anarchy and price of
stability by combining Propositions 37 and 38 for the former and
Propositions 39 and 38 for the latter.
6. DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK
For the directed setting (c` = 0), we show that for k = ∞, asyn-
chronous stochastic edge dynamics converge to a stable network;
moreover these fixed points can have non-trivial network structure.
Our proof does not generalize to the case of k < ∞, and we leave
open the question of whether these dynamics converge in that set-
ting. Proving bounds on the time to convergence and understanding
the regions of attraction would also be of interest as they inform the
distribution of networks we would expect to see from a generative
version of this model.
For the bidirected setting, we show that for arbitrary k the edge dy-
namics exhibit fast converge. However, developing an understand-
ing of best-response dynamics in which, in each time step, a vertex
v updates her strategy Sv in order to maximize her utility (poten-
tially by changing multiple edges simultaneously) with respect to
the current strategies S−v of the other agents, remains open as an
interesting line for future work. Our results do not directly gener-
alize as there is no reason why a best response would be limited
to only changing addable and removable edges (given two addable
edges, it is not necessarily optimal to add both). For some special
cases of our model, if the dynamics are performed synchronously,
the results from [2] apply. Pushing this line of work further could
be of interest.
With respect to the static game, we give classes of efficient net-
works (for k . √n) and symmetric-efficient networks (for 4 ≤ k).
While the former are stable for any cs, c` . k/2, the latter are only
stable for cs, c` ≤ 1; for the latter we rely on a long line of work
from combinatorics, and determining whether any symmetric sta-
ble network exists appears to be a deep and technically challenging
open problem.
Lastly, an important direction for future work would be to evaluate
real-world networks and see if and when this model can explain
the structure. In particular, understanding the ranges of parameters
observed in real networks may lead to interesting insights about the
network participants and the forces that drive them.
7. OTHER RELATED WORK
Due to the vast range of applications; from sociology to commerce,
biology and physics, with drastically different underlying proper-
ties, many models have been developed and studied in depth (see
[19] for a survey). Starting with G(n, p) [4, 8], stochastic models
have often taken a forefront. Depending on the observed network
properties, different models take the forefront, such as preferential
attachment models [3] for specific degree distributions, or small-
worlds models [22] for capturing social networks. An alternate
approach, is to take an existing network and fit a model using tech-
niques from machine learning. For example, a the authors of [15]
attempt to understand the Twitter network by fitting a stochastic
model. However, while stochastic and learned models can explain
on a macro level what is occurring in a network, on a micro level,
i.e., looking at individual nodes and its edges, they remain uninfor-
mative; the motivation as to why a node would maintain an edge
is abstracted away. We instead consider game theoretic models of
a network in which each node is a selfish agent and decided if and
whom to connect to based on her utility.
There has been a lot of very interesting work on network formation
(see [12] and [20] Chapter 19 for nice surveys coming out of the
Economics and Algorithmic Game Theory literature respectively).
Myerson was the first to consider such models (see, e.g., [1, 18]).
However, formulated the problem as a cooperative game where
agents worked together towards a common goal; in our setting we
assume agents have individual, or selfish, goals. In another line
of work, global connection games (see [20]) are studied in which
agents are not nodes in the network, rather vested parties in (indi-
vidual) global connectivity properties of the game.
More closely related models consider selfish agents that are nodes
in undirected networks. [14] introduced a model for the study of
the (static) stability of undirected networks. Also known as the
local connection game (see [20]), nodes have discounted (based on
path length) rewards for being connected to another agent, and cost
for making a link. Their goal was to understand the relationship
between stability and efficiency, which led to further results in this
direction (see, e.g., [6, 11]). The authors of [21] consider edge
dynamics for this undirected model. This is further studied by [13]
where it is shown that the stochastic best response dynamics may
not converge; this is in contrast to our model which will always
converge to a stable network.
Directed networks allow one individual to connect to another with-
out the consent of the second individual, and thus applications are
to settings such as Twitter following, while undirected network cap-
ture social networks where links are reciprocal, such as Facebook
friendship.
The difference between directed and undirected graphs is not just
a technicality when it comes to modeling. In undirected networks,
edges are implicitly reciprocal, hence consent is required from both
endpoints; thus, undirected models are suitable for many forms of
economic and social relationships. For directed networks, however,
a vertex can link directly to another without reciprocally; thus, di-
rected models are more suitable for capturing interactions that are
passive in one direction, as with the consumption of public content.
The closest related work to our setting, by Bala and Goyal [2], stud-
ies the stability, efficiency, and dynamics of directed networks. In
fact, their can be viewed as a special case of ours when c` = 0 and
k = ∞. However, their dynamics differ significantly from ours;
they use lazy simultaneous best-response dynamics while we con-
sider asynchronous stochastic edge dynamics. Due to the nature of
their update, their process always converges to either a cycle or the
empty network. Not only are our dynamics more natural because
coordination is not required and connections are evaluated on an
individual basis, but the class of networks that are fixed points of
our dynamics is nontrivial.
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APPENDIX
A. CONVERGENCE FOR DIRECTED CASE
Lemma 25 After step 8, we removed at least one edge from being
addable at any point in the future. Moreover, the number of large
components does not increase.
PROOF. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 33, we
know that step 8 + 1 cannot increase the number of large compo-
nents.
We prove that the edge rksk cannot be added again in the future.
Let T1 be the largest component in G (before step 8) and let T ′′1 be
the largest component in G′′ (after step 8+1). We reserve T ′1 and
G′ for an intermediary graphs.
It now suffices to argue that T ′′1 ∈ RG′′(sk); hence either sk ∈ T ′′1 ,
or rksk was removed in step 1 (after we added it in step 8), in
which case |RG′′(sk) \ T ′′1 | < c. Since steps 7 and 8 cannot in-
crease RG′′(sk) for any future G′′, the edge rksk will never be-
come addable again.
For sake of contradiction, assume T ′′1 6∈ RG′′(sk). Let xy be
the first removable edge such that T ′1 6⊆ RG′−xy(sk); hence, xy
must have been on every path from sk to T ′1, and in particular
x ∈ RG′(sk) and T1 6⊆ RG′−xy(x). However, |T1| > c, hence xy
is not removable which gives a contradiction.
Lemma 26 If vw is an addable edge in G, then v and w belong to
different strongly connected components of G.
PROOF. An edge vw is addable ifUG+vw(v) > UG(v), in other
words |RG+vw(v) \ RG(v)| ≥ c. Assume that v and w belong to
same strongly connected component. Thus RG(v) = RG(w), and
hence RG+vw(v) = RG(v). Therefore the positive component of
the utility for v does not increase, while the negative component
would decrease. Hence no such vw edge is addable.
Lemma 27 The component-level network is a directed acyclic graph.
PROOF. Assume for sake of contradiction, that some set of two
or more components form a cycle in the component-level graph.
Then, for every u, v in the cycle, there must be some path from
u to v as there is a path between any two vertices within every
component, and a path between any two components via the cy-
cle. Hence, the cycle in fact forms a strongly connected component
contradicting the maximality of the partition.
Lemma 28 If uv is not removable in G, then |RG(v)| ≥ c.
If |RG(v)| < c, then by removing uv, the positive component of
the utility decreases by less than c while the negative component
decreases by c. Hence, uv is removable.
Lemma 29 If G has no removable edge then any leaf component
must either be an isolated vertex or large.
PROOF. Since G has no removable edge then by lemma 28 any
edge uv must have |RG(v)| ≥ c. Consider a leaf component C,
and consider any edge uv such that v ∈ C. If some such edge
exists, then RG(v) = RG(C), and since C is a leaf |RG(C)| =
|C|. hence, |C| > c. If no such edge exists, then C must be an
isolated vertex.
Lemma 30 If G has no removable edge but an addable edge, then
there exists a large component in G.
PROOF. There exists some edge uv in G that is addable. From
Lemma 26, we know that u and v must be in different components
C1, C2. Since uv is addable |RG(C2) \ RG(C1)| ≥ c. Toward
contradiction assume that |C2| < c. Thus, there must be at least
one other component that is reachable from C2. Thus, the compo-
nent level graph has at least one leaf, and, by lemma 29, that leaf
must be of size at least c. Thus, there exists at least one component
of s ize at least c.
Lemma 31 For any large component C and u, v ∈ V , such that
v ∈ C and C 6⊆ RG(u), edge uv is addable.
PROOF. SinceC is large and is not reachable from u, then |RG+uv(u)\
RG(u)| = |RG(v) \RG(u)| ≥ |C| ≥ c. Thus, (u, v) is addable.
Lemma 32 Omitting removable edges does not increase the num-
ber of large components in graph.
PROOF. Let (u, v) be a removable edge in G and let C be the
component that contains u. If v 6∈ C, then removing uv does not
change the strongly connected components of G. Assume v ∈ C.
Let S = RG(u)\RG−uv(u) be the set of vertices that are reachable
from u only through uv. Because uv is removable, we know that
|S| < c. If C divided to two new components after the removal of
uv, then C ∩ S and C \ S will form two different components in
G−uv. Moreover |S∩C| ≤ |S| < c. Thus we have not increased
the number of large connected components in G− uv.
Lemma 33 After adding an edge as in step 5 and then completing
step 1, the number of large components at the beginning of step 5
has reduced by at least 1.
PROOF. Clearly, adding edges cannot increase the number of
components. Moreover, sinceLi is a leaf of Ti, andLi and Ti there
is clearly a path from every ri ∈ Ti to every xi ∈ Li in the original
graph. Using the new edge `iri, there is now also a path from every
xi ∈ Li to every ri ∈ Ti. Hence this reduces the number of large
components by at least one. By lemma 32, omitting removable
edges does not increase the number of large components in graph.
Thus, overall, the number of large components reduces by at least
one.
Lemma 34 After adding an edge as in step 6 and then completing
step 1, the number of large components at the beginning of step 6
reduces by at least one.
PROOF. Clearly, adding edges cannot increase the number of
components. Moreover, after adding r2r1 (and if necessary r1r2),
the two large components T1, T2 are in the same large component
in the new graph. Hence, the number of large components has re-
duced by at least one. By lemma 32„ omitting removable edges
does not increase the number of large components in graph. Thus,
overall, the number of large components reduces by at least one.
Lemma 35 After adding an edge as in step 7 and then completing
step 1, the number of large components at the beginning of step 7
does not increase and the number of components without a direct
edge to T1 decreases by one.
PROOF. Note that, at the beginning of step 7 there is a single
large component (otherwise we would be in step 5 or 6). Clearly,
adding the edge reduces the number of components without a di-
rect edge to T1, and adding edges cannot increase the number of
components or create more roots. We now show that no edge is
removable when we go to step 1, everything that holds after step 7
must also hold after step 7+1.
Let G be the network at the beginning of step 7. For sake of contra-
diction, assume that xy is a removable edge; thus, |RG+sjr1(x)\
RG+sjr1−xy(x)| < c. Since sjr1 was addable in G, we know
that xy 6= sjr1. Additionally, since sj was an isolated vertex in
G we know that it has no other edge and hence x 6= sj . More-
over, since sj was an isolated vertex in G, we know it has no in-
coming edge, and hence x 6∈ RG+sjr1(z) for any z 6= x. Thus,
RG+sjr1−xy(x) = RG−xy(x) and RG+sjr1(x) = RG(x), and
this implies that |RG(x) \ RG−xy(x)| < c, and hence xy was
removable in G. This gives a contradiction, as no such xy exists
at the beginning of step 7 (as it would have been removed in the
previous step 1).
Lemma 36 There is exactly one large-component T1, this set T1
is reachable from every component, and there must be at least one
small component Sk with no incoming edge such that |RG(Sk) \
T1| > c.
PROOF. Exactly one large-component T1, since at least one large
component exists (Lemma 30) and if two or more exists we would
be in step 5 or 6. Moreover, T1 is reachable from every component,
otherwise we would be in step 7. Lastly, we know that there must
be some small component Sk such that |RG(Sk) \ T1| > c, other-
wise no edge addable. In particular, any rsk edge with r ∈ T1 and
sk ∈ Sk is addable.
B. PRICE OF STABILITY AND ANARCHY
Proposition 37 If cs ≥ 1 or c` ≥ 1 then the empty network is
pairwise stable. Moreover, if cs > n − 1 or c` > n − 1 then the
only stable network (and hence the only pairwise stable graph) is
the empty graph.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 37. Assume without loss of general-
ity that cs ≥ 1. We will prove the contrapositive. Assume that
G is not pairwise stable. Since the network is empty, there are no
possible edges to remove. Thus, there must exists a pair of vertices
v, w such that UsG+svw+`wv (v) > U
s
G(v) and U
`
G+svw+`wv (w) ≥
U `G(w). This implies that U
s
G+svw+`vw (v) = U
s
G(v) + 1 − cs >
UsG(v), and thus cs < 1.
Now, suppose that cs > n − 1. Note that in a stable network,
the utility for any vertex v is at least 0 since this can always by
attained by taking the strategy Sv = ∅. Assume that a network G
is nonempty. Thus, there must exist at least one vertex v such that
ds+(v) > 0. Let v be such a vertex. Then UsG(v) = |RsG(v)| −
cs · ds+(v) ≤ (n− 1)− cs < 0. Thus, G is not stable.
Proposition 38 If k =∞, and 0 < cs ≤ n− 1, 0 < c` ≤ n− 1,
then the cycle is the only efficient network.
PROOF. For ease of notation, we drop k = ∞ from the sub-
scripts. For an arbitrary node v, if ds+G(v) = 0 then there does
not exist a speaking path from v to rest of the network, and hence
UsG(v) = |RsG(v)| − cs · ds+G(v) = 0. Otherwise, if ds+G(v) ≥ 1,
then the rest of network may be reachable from v. Hence, |RsG(v)| ≤
n−1 where equality occurs if and only if all other nodes are reach-
able from v. Therefore
UsG(v) = |RsG(v)| − cs · ds+G(v) ≤ (n− 1)− cs,
and we know that cs < (n− 1). Hence, in the case of equality, the
utility is improved over the setting where ds+G(v) = 0. Similarly,
it follows that
U `G(v) ≤ (n− 1)− c`.
Thus we can conclude that
UG(v) = U
s
G(v) + U
`
G(v) ≤ (n− 1)− (cs + c`)
so
ϕ(G) =
∑
v
UG(v) ≤ n · ((n− 1)− (cs + c`))
By the definition of efficiency, a network is efficient if it maximizes
ϕ thus if we be able to find a network say G such that ϕ(G) =
n · ((n−1)− (cs+ c`)) then we could conclude that G is efficient.
Now we consider cycle C to compute ϕ(C). A cycle C is a closed
path v1, v2, . . . vn, vn+1 such that vn+1 = v1, ∀1≤i≤n svivi+1 ∈
Es, `vi+1vi ∈ E`. Thus by the definition of reachability for
any v, w ∈ C, v ∈ RsG,∞(w), v ∈ R`G,∞(w) so |RsG(v)| =
|R`G,∞(v)| = n − 1. Moreover for any node v ∈ C we have
ds+C(v) = d`
+
C(v) = 1. Therefore
ϕ(G) =
∑
v
UG(v)
=
∑
v
(n− 1)− (cs + c`))
= n · ((n− 1)− (cs + c`)).
Now we prove that cycle is the unique efficient network. By contra-
diction assume that there exists another efficient network G 6= C
where ϕ(G) = n · ((n − 1) − (cs + c`)). According to the first
part of proof, the only condition for holding this equality is that
for all v ∈ V it holds that ds+G(v) = d`+G(v) = 1, |RsG(v)| =
|R`G(v)| = n − 1, thus G is connected in other words, for all
v, w ∈ V , we have that v ∈ RsG(w) and v ∈ R`G(w) = 1. More-
over since the speaking outdegree of each node is one, so if we only
consider speaking edges, we will have one cycle on the nodes. Now
we want to show that listening edges are exactly in opposite direc-
tion of speaking edges. If not, there must exist pair (v, w) such
that svw ∈ Es, `wv /∈ E` thus by the same proof used in propo-
sition 11, node v could improve her utility by removing svw and
this action dos not change other nodes’ utility. This improvement
in social welfare contradicts with efficiency of G.
Proposition 39 For k =∞, if 0 ≤ cs ≤ n−1 and 0 ≤ c` ≤ n−1,
then the cycle C is pairwise stable.
PROOF. We first prove stability, and then use Lemma 20 to show
that pairwise stability must also hold. Using the same proof pre-
sented in Proposition 38, we know that for all v ∈ V , we have
|RsG(v)| = |R`G(v)| = n − 1 and ds+C(v) = d`+C(v) = 1. To
prove the stability of C we must show that for all agents v and any
alternate strategy S′v ⊆ V , we have
USv,S−v (v) ≥ US′v,S−v (v).
There are only four possible moves for node vi.
1. Adding sviw such that w 6= vi+1
2. Removing svivi+1
3. Adding `viw such that w 6= vi+1
4. Removing `vivi+1 .
Now we show that after any such change, the utility of vi will de-
crease. Without loss of generality, consider a change to a speaking
edge. We know that |RsC(v)| = |R`C(v)| = n − 1 which is the
maximum possible, so by adding a new speaking edge we could not
gain; however we will loose cs thus UC+sviw (vi) = UC(vi)− cs
and since cs > 0 so UC+sviw (vi) < UC(vi). In the case of delet-
ing, if we remove a speaking edge, then ds+C(vi) = 0 thus for all
w ∈ V,w 6= vi we have w /∈ RsC(vi) so |RsC(vi)| = 0. Therefore,
UC−sviw (vi) = UC(vi) + cs − (n − 1), and since cs < (n − 1)
so UC−sviw (vi) < UC(vi). The same reasoning used for listening
edges. Hence the cycle is stable. By Lemma 20, it is also pairwise
stable.
We conclude this section with a characterization of all efficient and
stable networks for k = 1. The proof follows directly from the
definitions.
Proposition 40 Assume k = 1. If cs, c` > 1 then the empty net-
work is efficient and is the only stable graph. If cs, c` ≤ 1 then the
complete network is efficient; if cs < 1 or cs < 1 then the com-
plete network is the only only stable graph. If cs = c` = 1, then
all graphs are efficient and stable.
C. OTHER PROOFS
PROOF OF LEMMA 9. For sake of contradiction, assume that G
is pairwise stable but is not stable. Since G is pairwise stable so for
any speaking edge svw ∈ Es we have UG(v) ≥ UG−svw (v) and
for any listening edge `vw ∈ E` we have UG(v) ≥ UG−`vw (v).
Hence, G has no removable edge. And because we assume that
G is not stable so there must exist a speaking edge svw 6∈ Es
where UG(v) < UG+svw or a listening edge `vw 6∈ E` where
UG(v) < UG+`vw (v) which contradicts the definition of pairwise
stability.
PROOF OF LEMMA 11. We will prove the contrapositive. As-
sume that there exist vertices v, w ∈ V such that svw ∈ Es
and `wv /∈ E`. Since `wv /∈ E`, if for any node z we have
z ∈ RsG,k(v), then, by the definition of reachability, there exists a
path from v to z that does not use edge svw. Thus there is no node
z such that z ∈ RsG,k(v) and z 6∈ RsG−svw,k(v). In other words|RsG−svw,k(v)| = |RsG,k(v)|, and the positive component of the
utility is the same for v. However, ds+G−svw (v) = ds
+
G(v)− 1, so
the negative component of the utility is reduced by cs in G− svw.
Thus, UG−svw (v) = UG(v) + cs and, since cs > 0, we conclude
that UG−svw (v) > UG(v). Hence, G is could not be stable or pair-
wise stable. Moreover, deleting svw does not affect on the utility
of other vertices so ϕ(G− svw) > ϕ(G). Hence G is not efficient.
The proof follows analogously for `vw.
